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Abstract
We initiate the study of the destruction model (a.k.a. adversary model) introduced by Klie-
mann (2010), using the stability concept of swap equilibrium introduced by Alon et al. (2010).
The destruction model is a network formation game incorporating the robustness of a net-
work under a more or less targeted attack. In addition to bringing in the swap equilibrium
(SE) concept, we extend the model from an attack on the edges of the network to an attack
on its vertices. Vertex destruction can generally cause more harm and tends to be more
difficult to analyze.
We prove structural results and linear upper bounds or super-linear lower bounds on the
social cost of SE under different attack scenarios. The most complex case is when the vertex
to be destroyed is chosen uniformly at random from the set of those vertices where each
causes a maximum number of player pairs to be separated (called a max-sep vertex). We
prove a lower bound on the social cost of Ωpn3{2q for this case and initiate an understanding
of the structural properties of SE in this scenario. Namely, we prove that there is no SE that
is a tree and has only one max-sep vertex. We conjecture that this result can be generalized,
in particular we conjecture that there is no SE that is a tree. On the other hand, we prove
that if the vertex to be destroyed is chosen uniformly at random from the set of all vertices,
then each SE is a tree (unless it is two-connected). Our conjecture would imply that moving
from the uniform probability measure to a measure concentrated on the max-sep vertices,
means moving from no SE having a cycle (unless two-connected) to each SE having a cycle.
This would ask for a more detailed study of this transition in future work.
1 Introduction
Game theoretic models for the study of the decentralized formation of networks gained remark-
able attention during the past two decades. In most of those models, the vertices of a graph
correspond to players, and each player’s choice of action can have an influence on the structure
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of the graph. Models differ regarding the different actions available to the players and regarding
the criteria under which the quality of the graphs is evaluated. For the latter, most models have
focused on centrality-type criteria, for example, players aim to minimize the sum of distances
over all other players. Recently, robustness aspects have been addressed in the form of the
destruction model (a.k.a. adversary model) [11, 12, 13, 14]. In this model, players anticipate the
destruction of exactly one edge in the graph, and the cost function for each player v gives the
expected number of other players that v will no longer be able to reach after the destruction.
Social cost is the sum over all players’ costs, which is equal to the expected number of separated
vertex pairs, that is, the expected number of all ordered pairs pv, wq such that there is no path
anymore between v and w after destruction took place. The model allows many variations since
the edge to destroy is determined randomly according to a probability measure that may even
depend on the graph (this dependence is known to the players).1
In this work, we use the stability concept of swap equilibrium (SE) [1] for the destruction model.
Moreover, we extend the model to the destruction of exactly one vertex instead of an edge.
We will henceforth speak of edge destruction model and vertex destruction model in order to
distinguish the two.
Previous and Related Work
Network formation games date back to the 1990ies, see Jackson and Wolinsky [10] for an early
publication. In Computer Science, network formation games have gained attention since the
work by Fabrikant et al. [7] in 2003. The destruction model was introduced by Kliemann in
2010 [11] and subsequently studied in a series of publications [12, 13, 14]. The focus was on
the price of anarchy for Nash equilibrium (NE) and pairwise stability (PS). Earlier works
on robustness in network formation include [2, 5, 9, 10, 18]. None of those earlier models
allows a structure-dependent destruction probability as in the destruction model; for a detailed
discussion we refer to [12, Sec. 4].
The stability concepts of NE and PS require an edge cost parameter α P Rą0. Computationally
deciding whether a graph constitutes an NE is hindered by an exponential search space, and can
indeed be NP-hard [7]. This has raised concerns about the applicability of the model, since we
should not expect players to solve an NP-hard problem. Therefore, many variations have been
introduced in order to make the model more tractable. Usually, the idea is to limit the choices of
the players, for example, to single-edge deviations [10, 15]. An even more drastic approach was
suggested by Alon et al. in 2010 [1]. They removed the α parameter and considered only edge
swaps: as graph is a swap equilibrium if no player can improve her cost by removing an incident
edge and then creating a new incident edge – this action is called an edge swap. It is also
allowed to simply remove an incident edge without creating a new one, which can make sense if
edges can be harmful, e. g., if cost incorporates the risk of contagion. A variation, introduced by
1The name “adversary model” is the original one. However, “adversary” was found to be more suited to
describe an entity that aims at maximizing cost under equilibrium. This is not necessarily the case in our model.
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Mihalák and Schlegel in 2012 [17], are edge ownerships: each edge is owned by exactly one of its
endpoints and may only be swapped (or removed) by its owner. The resulting stability concept
is called asymmetric swap equilibrium (ASE). We do not consider edge ownerships or ASE in
this work, but this extension is most certainly interesting for future work.
The following three recent publications address robustness in a network formation framework
similar to ours:
• Meirom et al. [16] consider a cost function that uses a linear combination of the lengths of
two short disjoint paths. The idea is that players build a graph where for each shortest path,
there is a backup path of reasonable length.
• Goyal et al. [8] consider a model where each player, in addition to building edges, can choose
to immunize herself in exchange for a fee. Then an adversary selects a connected component
of non-immunized vertices to destroy; an alternative description is that the adversary picks a
vertex and then the destruction spreads from there while immunized vertices act as firewalls.
A player’s utility is the expected size of her connected component after the destruction took
place, which is 0 if the player itself is destroyed. This utility is almost exactly the positive
version of our cost: if Cpvq is the expected number of cut-off vertices, then n´ Cpvq is the
expected size of v’s component after the attack. (We differ in that if the player itself is
attacked, we say that it is cut-off from n ´ 1 vertices, so its components size is 1, not 0.)
However, the kind of destruction is very different from ours. Although it can be formulated
as an attack on a vertex, the contagious properties of the attack move the focus to different
connectivity properties of the attacked vertex in comparison to our model. For example, if a
leaf (that is, a vertex of degree 1) is attacked in our model, the overall damage is relatively
small, namely we have 2pn´1q separated vertex pairs. In their model however, if the neighbor
of the leaf is not immunized, the destruction will spread and the overall damage can be much
higher.
For earlier work on network formation with contagious risk, see [3].
• Chauhan et al. [4] extended the edge destruction model by incorporating distances: cost for
player v is the expected sum of distances to all other players after edge destruction.
Our Contribution
We prove quantitative and structural results for two types of destroyers under the stability
concept of swap equilibrium (SE): the uniform destroyer picks an edge or vertex uniformly
at random, while the extreme destroyer picks an edge or vertex uniformly at random from
the set of edges or vertices, respectively, where the destruction of each causes a maximum
number of vertex pairs to be separated. An edge or vertex that does the latter is called a
max-sep edge or max-sep vertex, respectively. For edge destruction, we also consider some
variations, most notably a destroyer that chooses an edge from the set of bridges uniformly
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at random. For vertex destruction, we also consider the case that the probability for destruc-
tion of a vertex v is proportional to its degree degpvq, which we call the degree-proportional
destroyer.
We prove that for uniform and extreme edge destruction and uniform bridge destruction, an
SE is bridgeless or has a star-like structure. A consequence of this is that in terms of social
cost, those SE are very efficient, namely social cost of any of those SE is Opnq. For uniform
vertex destruction, we prove that if an SE is not two-connected, then it is a tree. This again
implies an Opnq bound on the social cost.
For the degree-proportional vertex destroyer, the situation is very different. Social cost of an
SE can be as high as Ωpn2q, which is the highest order possible in this model. This lower bound
is attained on a simple graph, namely a star.
For extreme vertex destruction, we also give a super-linear lower bound on the social cost
of SE, namely Ωpn3{2q. The construction is still roughly star-like, but more complicated:
we need a clique of certain size at the center to which paths up to a certain length are
attached.
Finally, we prove a structural result for extreme vertex destruction: if n ě 8, there is no tree
SE with only one max-sep vertex. This means that in a tree SE (with n ě 8), the destroyer will
always have at least two vertices to choose from.
Ongoing Work and Open Problems
We have extensive experimental evidence and also indications on the theory side that our
structural result for the extreme vertex destroyer (that there is no SE tree with one max-sep
vertex for n ě 8) can be extended in two ways. We conjecture for n “ Ωp1q:
(i) There is no SE graph under extreme vertex destruction with only one max-sep vertex.
(This extends our result for trees to general graphs.)
(ii) There is no SE graph under extreme vertex destruction that is a tree. (This extends our
non-existence result for trees with one max-sep vertex to trees in general.)
We expect to prove at least one of those two conjectures in the near future.
Recall that we prove that unless the graph is two-connected, an SE cannot contain cycles
for the uniform vertex destroyer. On the other hand, for the extreme vertex destroyer, our
conjecture (ii) would imply that an SE is only possible if we have at least one cycle. It would
then be interesting to find a family pDεqεPr0,1s of vertex destroyers such that D0 is the uniform
destroyer and D1 is the extreme destroyer, and the others are something suitable in between.
When moving ε from 0 to 1, the probability measure should concentrate more and more on the
max-sep vertices. It would then be interesting to find out at which values of ε the situation
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switches from no non-two-connected SE having a cycle to each SE having a cycle. Our conjecture
(ii) would imply that it must switch an odd number of times.
Another interesting direction is the extension to edge ownerships and the asymmetric swap
equilibrium. Closing the gap between our lower Ωpn3{2q bound and the trivial Opn2q upper
bound for social cost of extreme vertex destruction is also an open task.
2 Model and Notation
Fix the number of players n P Ně3. All our graphs are finite, simple, and undirected. The
undirected edge {v, w} between vertices v and w is denoted vw or wv. Denote Gn the set
of all graphs on the vertex set Vn :“ rns :“ {1, . . . , n}. We use the term player and vertex
synonymously for graphs in Gn. A swap for a graph G P Gn is a triple of players pa, b, cq such
that ab P EpGq and ac R EpGq. Denote SpGq Ď V 3n the set of all swaps of G. Denote G`pa, b, cq
the graph that is obtained from G by removing ab and inserting ac; we say that player a
swaps her edge ab for the new edge ac. A cost function CG for G P Gn assigns to each player
v P Vn a number CGpvq P Rě0. The social cost of G is SCpGq :“∑vPVn CGpvq. We call G a swap
equilibrium (SE) if CGpaq ď CG`pa,b,cqpaq for all pa, b, cq P SpGq and CGpaq ď CG´abpaq for all
ab P EpGq.
Edge Destruction. Let G P Gn be connected. For v, w P Vn denote RGpv, wq the set of all v-w
paths in G. The relevance of e P EpGq for v P Vn is
relGpe, vq :“ |{w P Vn ; @P P Rpv, wq : e P EpP q}| ,
that is, the number of vertices for which in order to reach them from v, we necessarily have
to traverse edge e. When e is removed from the graph, then there will be exactly relGpe, vq
vertices that v will no longer be able to reach; we also say that those vertices are cut-off from v
or that v is cut-off from them. An edge destroyer D is a map that associates with each G P Gn
a probability measure DG on EpGq, that is, DGpeq P r0, 1s for each e, and ∑ePEpGqDGpeq “ 1.
Given D, we define the cost for player v in G as
CGpvq :“
∑
ePE
relGpe, vqDGpeq ,
that is, the expected number of vertices that v will be cut-off from after one edge is re-
moved randomly according to the measure DG. If G is disconnected, cost is defined to
be 8.
The separation seppeq of an edge e P EpGq is the number of ordered player pairs pv, wq
such that the removal of e will destroy all v-w paths in G. If e is a non-bridge, then clearly
seppeq “ 0. Otherwise, G ´ e has exactly two components, say K1,K2 Ď Vn, and we call
νpvq :“ min {|K1|, |K2|} the minimal-component size of e. Then seppeq “ 2νpeqpn´ νpeqq. It is
easy to see that SCpGq “∑ePEpGq seppeqDGpeq.
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Vertex Destruction. For the vertex destruction model, the destroyer D associates each G P Gn
with a probability measure on the vertices of G, that is, DGpvq P r0, 1s for each v P Vn, and∑
vPVn DGpvq “ 1. We define the destruction of a vertex not as its removal from the graph, but
as the removal of all its incident edges. This is reflected by the following definition of relevance
and cost. The relevance of u P Vn for v P Vn is
relGpu, vq :“ |{w P Vn ; @P P Rpv, wq : u P V pP q}| .
Note that since v is in every v-w path, we have relGpv, vq “ n´ 1, which is exactly the number
of vertices that will be cut-off from v if all edges incident with v are removed. Given a vertex
destroyer D, we define the cost for player v in G as
CGpvq :“
∑
uPV
relGpu, vqDGpuq .
Again, a disconnected graph induces infinite cost for each player.
The separation seppuq of a vertex u P Vn is the number of ordered player pairs pv, wq such
that the removal of u will destroy all v-w paths in G. It is again easy to see that SCpGq “∑
uPVn seppuqDGpuq. Moreover, if removal of u creates k components (not counting u itself) of
sizes β1, . . . , βk, we have
seppuq “ n2 ´ 1´
k∑
i“1
β2i . (1)
When the graph G is clear from context, we omit the G subscripts or arguments. When a graph
G1 is defined, we write C1, rel1, SC1 etc. instead of CG1 , relG1 , SCpG1q, etc., respectively. The
same goes for G2.
For any connected graph G “ pV,Eq, we call I Ď V an island if it is inclusion-maximal under
the condition that the induced subgraph GrIs is bridge-free (it does not matter whether we
mean bridges of G or bridges of GrIs). The bridge tree G˜ of G is obtained by collapsing each
island I of G to a single vertex I˜ and inserting an edge between I˜ and J˜ if and only if an edge
runs in G between a vertex of I and a vertex of J . Obviously, IJ ÞÑ I˜ J˜ is a bijection between
the set of bridges of G and the set of bridges of G˜, and we will often identify those two sets.
We refer to [12] for a more formal treatment of the bridge tree.
We will also use the better-known block-cutvertex tree, see, e. g., the book by Diestel [6] for a
definition.
3 Uniform Edge and Uniform Bridge Destruction
Denote BpGq Ď EpGq the set of all the bridges of G P Gn and
SBpGq :“ {pa, b, cq P SpGq ; ab P BpGq ^G` s is connected}
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the set of bridge swaps (the case that G`s is disconnected is not interesting since such a swap can
never bring an improvement). Clearly, ac P BpG`sq for each pa, b, cq P SBpGq.
An edge destroyer D is called the uniform edge destroyer if DGpeq “ 1|EpGq| for each e P EpGq
and each G P Gn. It is called the uniform bridge destroyer if DGpeq “ 1|BpGq| for each e P BpGq
and DGpeq “ 0 for each e P EpGqzBpGq, for each G P Gn. (If BpGq “ H, the graph is 2-edge-
connected and we can take any probability measure for DG since cost for each player is 0 in
any case.)
In order to point out what are some of the essential properties of those destroyers, we look at
more general destroyers first. Consider the following condition on a destroyer:
@G P Gn @s “ pa, b, cq P SBpGq :
sepGpabq “ sepG`spacq ùñ DGpabq “ DG`spacq
^ @e P EpGq X EpG` sq : sepGpeq “ sepG`speq ùñ DGpeq “ DG`speq
(2)
This means that if after a bridge swap an edge maintains its separation, then it also maintains
its probability. This clearly includes the uniform edge destroyer and the uniformly bridge
destroyer. The next proposition shows that (2) is equivalent to the following simpler condi-
tion:
@G P Gn @s “ pa, b, cq P SBpGq :
DGpabq “ DG`spacq
^ @e P EpGq X EpG` sq : DGpeq “ DG`speq
(3)
This means that each edge carries its fixed probability that – in case of a bridge – sticks to it
even when it is swapped for another edge.
4 Proposition. (2) and (3) are equivalent.
Proof. It is clear that (3) implies (2). So let D be a destroyer with property (2). Let G P Gn
and s “ pa, b, cq P SBpGq. Since νGpabq “ νG`spacq, we have sepGpabq “ sepG`spacq, hence
DGpabq “ DG`spacq. Now, consider the special case first that pa, b, cq is a path in the bridge
tree. Then the only separation that changes due to s is that of bc. Since separations of all
other edges are maintained, they also maintain their probabilities. Since all the probabilities
add up to 1, the edge bc also maintains its probability. In the general case, we have a path
pv0 “ b, v1, . . . , vk “ cq. Conducting the sequence of swaps pa, v0, v1q, pa, v1, v2q, . . . , pa, vk´1, vkq
gives the graph G` s, and in each step the edges maintain their probability.
The following proof uses the basic idea from [1, Thm. 1].
5 Lemma. Let D be a destroyer with property (3). Then the bridge tree of an SE with respect
to D has diameter at most 2.
Proof. Let G be an SE and for contradiction assume that pa, b, c, dq is a path in its bridge tree.
Denote na, nb, nc, nd the numbers of vertices in the subtrees rooted at a, b, c and d, respectively,
hence n “ na`nb`nc`nd. Consider the swap s “ pa, b, cq. By (2), we have DGpabq “ DG`spacq,
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and also all other edges maintain their probabilities. We have relGpab, aq “ relG`spac, aq and
for all the other edges, from the view of a, the only relevance that changes is that of bc, namely
from nc ` nd to nb. Since G is an SE, this means nc ` nd ď nb. Likewise we consider the swap
pd, c, bq and obtain na ` nb ď nc. Together this implies na ď 0, which is impossible.
6 Theorem. Let G be an SE for the uniform edge destroyer. Then G is bridgeless or a star, hence
SCpGq ď 2pn´ 1q “ Opnq.
Proof. If G is bridgeless, then SCpGq “ 0. So assume that G contains a bridge. We want to
show that G is a tree, so for contradiction assume that G is not a tree. Let I be an island
containing a cycle and let bc be a bridge with b P I. Then there is a cycle C in I that traverses b.
Choose a so that ab P EpCq. Then the swap pa, b, cq puts the bridge bc on a cycle and makes it
part of the island, so its relevance for a drops from a positive value to 0. No new bridges are
introduced, and the relevances of all other edges remain the same for player a. Hence this is an
improving swap, a contradiction to SE.
Since we know that G is a tree, G coincides with its bridge tree. By Lemma 5, diampGq ď 2.
Since n ě 3, we conclude that G is a star. It follows SCpGq “ 2pn´ 1q.
7 Theorem. Let G be an SE for the uniform bridge destroyer. Then G is bridgeless or G˜ is a
star where each of the outer islands has exactly one vertex.2 Hence SCpGq ď 2pn´ 1q “ Opnq.
Proof. If G is bridgeless, then SCpGq “ 0. So assume that G contains a bridge. By Lemma 5,
G˜ is a star. Let I be an island that is not the center of the star (i. e., it is an outer island) and
that contains more than one vertex. Then I contains a cycle. By a swap as in the proof of
Theorem 6, the one bridge e between the center of the star and I can be put on a cycle. For the
players in I, this is a strict improvement since for them, e had the strictly highest relevance of
all bridges in G. The statement on the social cost follows since only one vertex can be separated
from the rest of the graph by the removal of a bridge.
4 Extreme Edge Destruction
For G P Gn denote sepmaxpGq :“ maxePEpGq seppeq and
EmaxpGq :“ {e P EpGq ; seppeq “ sepmaxpGq} .
We call the edges in EmaxpGq the max-sep edges. Recall seppeq “ 2νpeqpn ´ νpeqq and note
that x ÞÑ xpn´ xq is strictly increasing on r0, n{2s, hence νpeq “ νpe1q for all e, e1 P EmaxpGq.
Moreover if νpeq “ νpe1q for some e P EmaxpGq and e1 P EpGq, then e1 P EmaxpGq. In other
words: exactly all the edges with maximum νpeq are max-sep.
2If the star has only one edge and thus there are exactly two islands, this statement means that one of the
two islands has exactly one vertex.
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An edge destroyer D is called the extreme edge destroyer if DGpeq “ 1|EmaxpGq| for each e P
EmaxpGq and DGpeq “ 0 for each e P EpGqzEmaxpGq.
8 Theorem. Let G be an SE under the extreme edge destroyer. Then G is bridgeless or G˜ is a
star where each of the outer islands has exactly one vertex. Hence SCpGq ď 2pn´ 1q “ Opnq.
Proof. The expression for the social cost follows from the structural statement. Assume for
contradiction that G contains bridges and is not of the stated form.
Case 1: Emax “ {e1, . . . , ek} with k ě 2. By [12, Prop. 9.1], the max-sep edges form a star in
the bridge tree. For each i P rks denote Ki Ď Vn the (unique) minimal component of G´ ei,
and denote K0 the island at the center of the star formed by Emax. Then Vn “ ⊍ki“0Ki and
|Ki| “ |Kj | for all i, j P rks. By assumption, |Ki| ě 2 for each i.
Case 1.1: There is a leaf a P K1. Denote b the neighbor of a and let v P K0. Define G1 :“ G`
pa, b, vq. When moving from G to G1, all the edges e2, . . . , ek and the edges in GrK2s, . . . , GrKks
have their separation maintained. Edges in GrK1s have their separation maintained or reduced
since their minimal-component size reduces. The edge e1 has its separation reduced since its
minimal-component size reduces. The new edge av cannot become max-sep since νpavq “ 1
while νpe2q ě 2. It follows that E1max “ {e2, . . . , ek}. We have rel1pei, aq “ relpei, aq ă relpe1, aq
for all i ě 2. Hence C1paq ă Cpaq, a contradiction to SE.
Case 1.2: There is a cycle C in K1. Let ab P EpCq and v P K0. By essentially the same arguments
as in Case 1.1, we show that player a improves by the swap pa, b, vq.
Case 2: Emax “ {e1}. This case is more difficult since after reducing the separation of e1, we
have no other max-sep edges that could act as a reference. Denote K1 a component of G´ e1
with minimum size (if both components of G´ e1 have the same size, then pick one arbitrarily)
and denote K0 the island containing the endpoint of e1 that is not in K1.
Case 2.1: There is a leaf a P K1. Denote b the neighbor of a and let v P K0. Define G1 :“
G` pa, b, vq. We have ν 1pe1q “ νpe1q ´ 1, so sep1pe1q has the next lower possible value below
seppe1q. Hence E1max “ {e1, e2, . . . , ek} for zero or more additional edges e2, . . . , ek. Since they
all have the same minimum-component size, they cannot be in GrK1s, hence they form a star
with K0 as the center (this is the only way that they can form a star in the bridge tree). If
av R E1max, then C1paq “ νpe1q ´ 1 ă n´ νpe1q “ Cpaq, hence the swap is an improvement. If
av P E1max, then νpe1q ´ 1 “ ν 1pavq “ 1, so |K1| “ 2 and n ě 4. Moreover, k ě 2. It follows
C1paq “ 1k pn´ 1` pk ´ 1qpνpe1q ´ 1qq “ n´2k ` 1. On the other hand Cpaq “ n´ 2. If n ě 5 or
k ě 3, this implies an improvement. The remaining case of n “ 4 and k “ 2 is impossible since
for such n, the graph G1 is a star and thus k “ 3.
Case 2.2: There is a cycle C in K1. We consider a swap like the one in Case 1.2. It is not difficult
to see that rel1pe, aq ă relpe1, aq for each e P E1max, hence the swap is an improvement.
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5 Uniform and Degree-Proportional Vertex Destruction
A vertex destroyer D is called the uniform vertex destroyer if DGpuq “ 1n for each u P Vn and
each G P Gn.
For any connected graph G “ pV,Eq, denote BpGq the set of its blocks and ApGq Ď V the set
of its cutvertices (also known as articulation points). Denote Ĝ the block-cutvertex tree of G,
that is, V pĜq “ BpGqY¨ApGq and each edge in Ĝ runs between a block and a cutvertex, namely
Bv P EpĜq if B P BpGq and v P B X ApGq. We have |B| ě 2 for each B P BpGq. If |B| ě 3,
then GrBs is two-connected; we also say that B is two-connected in G. Recall also that in a
two-connected graph, for each vertex v we can find a cycle that visits v.
The following remark is proved by standard arguments, which are included here for complete-
ness.
9 Remark. Let G “ pV,Eq be any two-connected graph.
(i) Let x, y, v P V be three distinct vertices. Then there exist paths P “ pv, . . . , xq and
Q “ pv, . . . , yq with V pP q X V pQq “ {v}.
(ii) Let W Ď V with |W | ě 2 and v P V zW . Then there are x, y PW with x ‰ y and paths
P “ pv, . . . , xq and Q “ pv, . . . , yq with V pP q X V pQq “ {v} and V pP q XW “ {x} and
V pQq XW “ {y}.
Proof. (i) Add a new vertex z to the graph and connect it with x and with y. The resulting
graph is again two-connected. Using the global version of Menger’s theorem (see, e. g., [6,
Thm. 3.3.6]) we find two independent (that is, internally vertex-disjoint) v-z paths. Taking
subpaths yields the result.
(ii) Let x1, y1 P W , x1 ‰ y1 be any two distinct vertices in W . By (i), we find P 1 “ pv, . . . , x1q
and Q1 “ pv, . . . , y1q with
V pP 1q X V pQ1q “ {v} . (10)
Let x be the first vertex on P 1 that is also in W . Define P :“ pv, . . . , xq as a subpath of P 1.
Likewise, let y be the first vertex on Q1 that is also inW and define Q :“ pv, . . . , yq as a subpath
of Q1. By (10) we get x ‰ y, and the other properties follow from the choice of x and y.
11 Definition. Let G “ pV,Eq be any graph and pB1, b1, . . . , Bk, bk, Bk`1q, k ě 1, be a path in
its block-cutvertex tree Ĝ. Assume |B1| ě 3 and let C “ pb1, a, . . . , b1q be a cycle in B1. Let
c P Bk`1z{bk}. Then we call the swap pa, b1, cq a cycle extension with respect to pB1, Bk`1q;
note that B2, . . . , Bk and b1, . . . , bk are uniquely determined by the pair pB1, Bk`1q since Ĝ is
a tree.
The name “cycle extension” is chosen since the cycle C is extended into a larger cycle, thereby
merging the blocks that are traversed by the new cycle. The merging property is proved in the
next proposition.
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12 Proposition. With notation as in Definition 11, denote G1 :“ G` pa, b1, cq. Then in G1, all the
blocks B1, . . . , Bk`1 are merged into one block and the remaining blocks are maintained; in
particular, no new cutvertices emerge in G1 and the separation values of maintained cutvertices
do not increase.
Proof. The only non-obvious part is that B1 :“ B1 Y . . .YBk`1 is two-connected in G1, which
we will prove now. Denote C “ pb1, a, a1, . . . , at, b1q for some t. There is a cycle of the form
C 1 “ pb1, . . . , bk, . . . , c, a, a1, . . . , at, u1q that starts in B1, runs through B2, . . . , Bk`1 and finally
re-enters B1.
Let i P rk ` 1s with |Bi| ě 3 and v P BizV pC 1q. Claim: in G1, there are paths P “ pv, . . . , xq and
Q “ pv, . . . , yq with x, y P V pC 1q and x ‰ y such that V pP qXV pQq “ {v} and V pP qXV pC 1q “
{x} and V pQq X V pC 1q “ {y}.
Proof of Claim: Denote W :“ V pC 1q X Bi, then |W | ě 2. By Remark 9(ii) applied with W as
defined here the claim is clear for i ě 2, since such Bi is two-connected in G1 (and in G). Hence
we consider i “ 1. The difficulty is that B1 may not be two-connected in G1 since we removed
the edge a1u1. However, none of the paths P or Q guaranteed to exist by Remark 9(ii) in G
can use a1u1 since then that path would have more than one vertex in common with W . This
concludes the proof of the claim.
Now let v, w P B1 with v ‰ w. We show that in G1, there are two independent v-w paths.
• If v, w P Bi for some i ď k, then either Bi is two-connected and the statement is clear, or
|Bi| “ 2 in which case v, w P V pC 1q and the independent paths are given through C 1.
• Let v P Bi and w P Bj for i ‰ j. If v or w is located on C 1, then nothing has to be done for
that vertex; otherwise we connect it with C 1 via the paths guaranteed by the claim. It is
easy to see that this gives two independent v-w paths.
• Let v, w P B1. In G, we find two independent v-w paths P and Q in B1. At most one of them,
say P , uses ab1. Instead of using that edge we can, starting at b1, run along C 1 until we
reach a. That b1-a path runs outside of B1 (except for a and b1) and thus will not interfere
with P or Q.
13 Theorem. An SE for the uniform vertex destroyer is two-connected (that is, it has only one
block) or it does not contain any cycle and thus is a tree.
Proof. Let an SE graph G P Gn be given and assume it contains more than one block. We only
need to prove that no block has a cycle, or, equivalently, that each block consists of only two
vertices. Suppose for contradiction that B1 is a block with |B1| ě 3 and let B2 be another
block. Let pa, b, cq be a cycle extension with respect to pB1, B2q and G1 :“ G ` pa, b, cq. By
Proposition 12, it follows that rel1pb, aq ă relpb, aq since in G1, removal of b cannot cut a off
the one or more vertices in B2z{b1} anymore. (Recall that a block always contains at least
two vertices.) All other relevances for a are maintained or also reduced. Therefore, we have an
improvement in the cost of player a, contradicting stability of G.
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14 Corollary. Let G P Gn be an SE for the uniform vertex destroyer. Then G is either two-
connected or a star, hence SCpGq “ 2pn´ 1q “ Opnq or SCpGq “ 3n´ 5` 2n “ Opnq.
Proof. Let G be non-two-connected. Then by Theorem 13, G is a tree. By applying the same
argument as in proof of Lemma 5, we obtain that the diameter of G is at most 2, i. e., G is a star.
The social cost of star is easily computed to be 1n
(
pn´ 1qp3n´ 4q` 2pn´ 1q
)
“ 3n´ 5` 2n .
A destroyer D is called the degree-proportional vertex destroyer if DGpuq “ degGpuq2m for each
u P Vn and each G P Gn.
15 Proposition. The star is an SE for the degree-proportional vertex destroyer, and its social cost
is 12pn2 ` nq ´ 1 “ Ωpn2q.
Proof. Let S P Gn be a star. First we prove that S is an SE. Clearly, by just removing an edge
(without creating a new one), no player can improve. It is also clear that the only possibility
for swapping is from one leaf to another leaf. Let a, c P V be leafs and b the center of the star.
Denote S1 :“ S ` pa, b, cq. Then we have:
CSpaq “ 12pn´ 1q
∑
wPV
relpw, aq ¨ degpwq “ 12pn´ 1q
(
pn´ 1q ` pn´ 2q ` pn´ 1qpn´ 1q
)
“ 12
(
n` 1´ 1
n´ 1
)
After swapping:
CS1paq “ 12pn´ 1q
(
3pn´ 1q ` pn´ 2q2 ` pn´ 3q
)
“ 12
(
n` 1´ 1
n´ 1
)
Hence, CSpaq “ CS1paq. Therefore, the star is an SE. Its social cost is:
SCpSq “ 12pn´ 1q
∑
vPV
∑
wPV
relpw, vq ¨ degpwq
“ pn´ 1q
(1
2
(
n` 1´ 1
n´ 1
))
` 12pn´ 1q ¨ pn´ 1qn
“ 12
(
pn2 ´ 1q ´ 1
)
` n2 “
1
2(n
2 ` n)´ 1
16 Corollary. The social cost of SE for the degree-proportional vertex destroyer can be as high as
Ωpn2q, which is the worst possible order in the destruction model.
6 Extreme Vertex Destruction
This model is defined similar to the extreme edge destruction model. Denote Vmax the set of
max-sep vertices and nmax :“ |Vmax|. The extreme vertex destroyer picks the vertex to destroy
uniformly at random from Vmax.
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Figure 1. Construction from Theorem 17 for t “ 4.
We start with a first step toward understanding the worst-case order of social cost of an SE
in this model, by giving an SE example with super-linear lower bound, namely Ωpn3{2q. It is
unknown at this time whether there is a matching upper bound.
17 Theorem. Let t ě 4 and 0 ď k ď 4t ´ 5 “ Θptq. Let G “ pV,Eq be the graph consisting
of a clique C on t vertices and to each vertex of C there is a path of length k attached (so
n :“ |V | “ tpk ` 1q). Then G is an SE with SCpGq “ Ωpn3{2q.
Proof. For each player v at distance 0 ď i ď k from C, we have:
seppvq “ 2
(
pn´ 1q ` pk ´ iq pn´ 1´ pk ´ iqq
)
Since k ´ i ď pn ´ 1q{2 and since the function x ÞÑ xpn ´ 1 ´ xq is strictly increasing on
r0, pn´ 1q{2s, separation is strictly largest when i “ 0, that is, when v P C. It follows Vmax “ C
and SCpGq “ 2ppn´ 1q ` kpn´ 1´ kqq “ Ωptk2q. If we choose k maximal, then k “ Θptq,
hence SCpGq “ Ωpt3q “ Θpn3{2q.
We prove the SE property. Just removing an edge (without building a new one) is clearly not
an option for the players on the paths. For a player of the clique C, also nothing changes when
removing an edge since due to t ě 4, the set C remains two-connected.
For u P C denote Vu the k vertices on the path attached to u (note that u R Vu). In the following,
whenever we consider a swap, by G1 we refer to the graph we obtain from G by applying the
swap.
We start with the different swaps available to a player a P C. We have relpu, aq “ k` 1 for each
u P Vmaxz{a}, hence
Cpaq “ pn´ 1q ` pt´ 1qpk ` 1q
t
.
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(i) Consider a swap pa, b, cq with b P C XNpaq and c P Vu for u P Cz{a}, that is, player a
swaps an edge from the clique to some path but not the one connected to a itself. Since
t ě 4, the set C remains two-connected. Separation of u and of some vertices in Vu is
reduced. All other separations are maintained. It follows:
Cpaq ´ C1paq “ pn´ 1q ` pt´ 1qpk ` 1q
t
´ pn´ 1q ` pt´ 2qpk ` 1q
t´ 1 “
k ´ n` 2
tpt´ 1q ă 0
Hence the swap is no improvement for player a.
(ii) Consider a swap pa, b, cq with b P C XNpaq and c P Va, that is, player a swaps an edge
from the clique to its own path. Again, since t ě 4, the set C remains two-connected.
The separation values on some vertices in Va decrease, but that does not change the set
of max-sep vertices nor their relevance for a. Hence player a’s cost is maintained.
(iii) Consider a swap pa, b, cq with b P Va; then in order to keep the graph connected, we have
c P Va. That is, player a swaps the first edge on its path to some vertex on that path. We
only have to exclude that c becomes max-sep; if we achieve that, then we know that a’s
cost is maintained. Let 2 ď l ď k ´ 1 be the distance between a and c. Then by (1):
sep1pcq ă sepmax
ðñ n2 ´ 1´ pl ´ 1q2 ´ pk ´ lq2 ´ pn´ kq2 ă n2 ´ 1´ k2 ´ pn´ 1´ kq2
ðñ k2 ` pn´ 1´ kq2 ă pl ´ 1q2 ` pk ´ lq2 ` pn´ kq2
ðñ pn´ 1´ kq2 ă ´2lpk ` 1´ lq ` 1` pn´ kq2
ðñ ´ 2pn´ kq ă ´2lpk ` 1´ lq
ðñ n´ k ą lpk ` 1´ lq ðù n´ k ą pk ` 1q
2
4
ðñ tpk ` 1q ą pk ` 1q
2
4 ` k ðñ t ą
k ` 1
4 ` 1´
1
k ` 1
ðù 4t´ 5 ě k
The latter is true by the restriction on k in the statement of the theorem. In this
computation, we used again that the function x ÞÑ xpk`1´xq is increasing on r0, pk`1q{2s.
We continue with the swaps available to a player a P Vu for some u P C.
(iv) Consider a swap pa, b, cq with distpu, aq ă distpu, bq. Then c P Vu with distpu, bq ă
distpu, cq, since otherwise the graph would become disconnected. From a computation
like in (iii), it follows that this swap cannot make c max-sep. Hence the cost of player a
does not change.
(v) Consider a swap pa, b, cq with distpu, aq ą distpu, bq. If c P Vu, then again a’s cost will not
change. If c P C, then c will become the only max-sep vertex in the new graph, clearly
increasing a’s cost.
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Now let c P Vw for some w ‰ u, that is, some vertices migrate from u’s path to w’s path.
Separation of w and separation of the vertices v P Vw with distpw, vq ď distpw, cq will
increase. All other separations are reduced or maintained, so we have V 1max Ď Vw Y {w}.
In the best case, k vertices migrate to w’s path, only w becomes max-sep, and rel1pw, aq “
n´ 2k. In this case:
Cpaq ´ C1paq “ pt´ 1qpk ` 1q ` pn´ kq
t
´ pn´ 2kq
“ pt´ 1qpk ` 1q ` ptpk ` 1q ´ kq ´ tptpk ` 1q ´ 2kq
t
“ pk ` 1qp2t´ t
2 ´ 1q ` p2t´ 1qk
t
ď pk ` 1qp2´ tq ` 2k ď ´2pk ` 1q ` 2k ă 0
Hence the swap is no improvement for player a.
18 Remark. The graph in Theorem 17 is no SE if k ě 4t ´ 4 “ 4pt ´ 1q, that is, if k is larger
than the upper bound in the theorem.
Proof. Let a P C and b her neighbor in Va. Let c P C be at distance l from a, to be specified
later. Denote G1 :“ G` pa, b, cq. If c becomes max-sep in G1, then player a’s cost will decrease
since rel1pc, aq “ k, whereas the relevance of a max-sep vertex in G for a is k ` 1 or n´ 1. By
the computation in Theorem 17(iii), we see that c becomes max-sep if n´ k ď lpk ` 1´ lq. We
have:
n´ k ď lpk ` 1´ lq ðñ t ď lpk ` 1´ lq
k ` 1 ` 1´
1
k ` 1 ðù t ď
lpk ` 1´ lq
k ` 1 `
4
5
For odd k ě 4pt´ 1q and l :“ k`12 , we have:
t ď lpk ` 1´ lq
k ` 1 `
4
5 ðñ t ď
pk ` 1q2{4
k ` 1 `
4
5 ðñ t ď
k ` 1
4 `
4
5
ðù t ď 4t´ 34 `
4
5 ðñ 0 ď
´3
4 `
4
5 ðñ 0 ď
1
20
For even k ě 4pt´ 1q and l :“ k2 , we have:
t ď lpk ` 1´ lq
k ` 1 `
4
5 ðñ t ď
k2
4 ` k2
k ` 1 `
4
5 ðñ t ď
k2 ` k
4pk ` 1q `
k
4pk ` 1q `
4
5
ðù t ď k4 `
1
4
4
5 `
4
5 ðñ t ď
k
4 ` 1 ðù t ď t´ 1` 1
In the remainder of this work, we provide more insight into the structure of tree SE graphs for
the extreme vertex destroyer.
19 Theorem. There is no SE tree with nmax “ 1, provided that n ě 8.
Proof. Let T “ pV,Eq be an SE tree with nmax “ 1 and u P Vmax. It is clear that u is a
cutvertex, otherwise G is two-connected and thus nmax “ n. Denote K1, . . . ,Kk, with k ě 2,
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the components of T ´ u ordered by non-decreasing sizes |K1| ď |K2| ď . . . ď |Kk|. For
convenience, denote ni :“ |Ki| for each i.
Let v P K1 and uv P E and w P K2 with degpwq “ 1. We consider T 1 :“ T ` pv, u, wq, that is,
we detach K1 from u and re-attach it to a leaf of K2.
Then rel1pw, vq “ relpu, vq, and so we have an improvement for v whenever V 1max contains at
least one vertex distinct from w. The latter is the case if sep1pwq ď sep1puq. Using (1), we
compute:
sep1pwq ď sep1puq ðñ n2 ´ 1´ n21 ´ pn´ n1 ´ 1q2 ď n2 ´ 1´ pn1 ` n2q2 ´
k∑
i“3
n2i
ðñ n21 ` pn´ n1 ´ 1q2 ě pn1 ` n2q2 `
k∑
i“3
n2i
ðñ pn´ n1 ´ 1q2 ě 2n1n2 `
k∑
i“2
n2i
ðñ
(
k∑
i“2
ni
)2
ě 2n1n2 `
k∑
i“2
n2i
ðñ ∑
2ďiăjďk
ninj ě n1n2 (˚)
Now, (˚) is true if k ě 3, since n1 ď n3.
Hence we may assume that k “ 2. Let v be the only vertex in Npuq XK2. If degpvq ě 3, then:
seppvq ě n2 ´ 1´ 1´ pn2 ´ 2q2 ´ pn1 ` 1q2
“ n2 ´ 1´ 1´ n22 ` 4n2 ´ 4´ n21 ´ 2n1 ´ 1
“ seppuq ´ 1` 4n2 ´ 4´ 2n1 ´ 1
“ seppuq ` 2p2n2 ´ n1q ´ 6
ě seppuq ` 2n2 ´ 6 ě seppuq
The last step is true since n2 ě pn´ 1q{2 ą 3. We conclude that degpvq ď 2. Since n ě 8, there
is w P Npvqz{u} with degpwq ě 2. We consider T 1 :“ T ` pu, v, wq. We have:
sep1puq ă sep1pwq ðù n21 ` n22 ą 1` pn2 ´ 2q2 ` pn1 ` 1q2
ðñ 0 ą 1´ 4n2 ` 4` 2n1 ` 1 ðñ 0 ą 2pn1 ´ 2n2q ` 6
ðñ 0 ą n1 ´ 2n2 ` 3 ðù n2 ą 3
Since the last statement is true, we know that V 1max “ {w}, hence C1puq “ n2 ă n´1 “ Cpuq.
16
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